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Abstract
There is a well-established literature that documents the failure of the uncovered
interest parity (UIP) condition. While a host of factors have been examined as
possible reasons behind this result, the role of uncertainty is not fully understood.
In this paper, we examine the extent to which economic uncertainty affects the UIP
condition in a sample of fourteen economies over the period 2003:1-2018:12. Using
threshold panel regression models and exchange rate survey data, we find evidence
that the UIP condition holds during low-uncertainty periods but does not during
high-uncertainty periods. This finding is robust to the inclusion of other controls,
different proxies of uncertainty, changes in the deposit maturity, and estimation
method.
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1 Introduction
Over the past four decades, the validity of the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition
has been extensively examined, but with mostly unfavorable results. The UIP condition
establishes that the expected returns in domestic currency of an asset denominated in
both domestic currency and foreign currency must be equal.1 Empirically, this condition
has been examined by regressing the (expected) change in the bilateral exchange rate
on the short-term deposit interest rate differential-the so-called Fama regression.2,3 In
this regression, the slope coefficient implied by the UIP condition is equal to one. Most
empirical studies, however, report that the estimated slope coefficient is either negative
or smaller than one (Froot and Thaler, 1990; Burnside et al., 2006, among others). This
result implies that the expected returns across currencies do not equalize, as economies
with a higher interest rate display a more appreciated exchange rate than that implied
by the UIP condition. This finding has been labeled the UIP puzzle.4
Several factors have been identified as possible reasons for this puzzle. First, most
empirical studies have examined the joint hypothesis of UIP and rational expectations
(Chinn and Meredith, 2004; Bussie`re et al., 2018). It is only under this joint null hypoth-
esis that the slope coefficient must be equal to one. A fundamental assumption behind
the Fama regression is that the covered interest parity (CIP) condition holds. According
to this condition, the return of a domestic asset and the return of a foreign asset expressed
in domestic currency using the forward exchange rate must be equal.
A vast literature documents that CIP generally holds in the data until the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC).5 Since then, some studies have reported deviations from the CIP
(Du et al., 2017; Cerutti et al., 2019). These deviations seem to reflect a combination
of structural factors, such as post-crisis changes in financial regulation; and transitory
1Domestic and foreign assets must be comparable in terms of their maturity, default risk, taxes, etc.
2The exchange rate is the spot rate of the domestic currency in units of the foreign currency (typically
the dollar) -thus an increase in the exchange rate means that the domestic currency has depreciated. The
expected change in the spot exchange rate refers to the h-period change. The interest rate differential
refers to the difference between the domestic currency deposit rate and foreign currency deposit rate,
both with maturity of h-periods.
3Fama (1984) established a relationship between the expected exchange rate change and the difference
between the forward value of the exchange rate and its spot rate. Several simplifying assumptions are
then needed to transform this relationship into the UIP regression equation -including the holding of the
covered interest rate parity, rational expectations, etc.
4Several studies have shown that this puzzle is more prevalent when using short-term (monthly, quar-
terly) data. When using long-term (5-years, 10-years) data, the estimated slope coefficients are positive
and closer to one (Chinn and Meredith, 2004; Chinn and Quayyum, 2013).
5During this period there were small and transient departure episodes from CIP -see, for instance,
Akram et al. (2008)- often associated with financial uncertainty and market turbulence. Despite these
episodes it was safe to assume that CIP held before the GFC.
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factors, such as divergent monetary policies across countries and the 2016 reform of the
US prime money market fund (Cerutti et al., 2019). The implications of these CIP
deviations on the UIP slope coefficient are, nevertheless, not well understood. Other
studies have examined whether exchange rate expectations are rational -that is, whether
exchange rate forecasts are unbiased. There is ample evidence to suggest the failure of
the unbiasedness hypothesis (Meese and Rogoff, 1983; Froot and Thaler, 1990; Flood and
Rose, 2002, among others) -since prediction errors are often negatively related to the
interest differential so that estimated slopes are negative.6
Second, some studies have noted that the Fama regression equation may be omitting
one or more important explanatory variables. If economic agents are risk-averse, then the
Fama regression equation needs to include a time-varying risk premia term. The exclusion
of such a variable in the Fama regression is likely to bias the slope coefficient downward.
Part of the literature suggests that in the case of standard consumer preferences, with
a risk aversion coefficient based on empirical studies, risk premiums might not vary suf-
ficiently to generate a negative slope coefficient; thus, the relevance of this variable is
downplayed (Engel, 1996).
More recent studies, however, have shown that by using non-standard preferences
(Verdelhan, 2010; Lustig et al., 2011) or introducing disaster risk (Farhi and Gabaix,
2016) it is possible to arrive at a time-varying risk premia term that has the potential to
explain the UIP puzzle. Other variables that could affect the time-varying risk premia
term are capital controls, exchange rate regime, inflation rate, and terms of trade (Farhi
and Werning, 2014). Nevertheless, these same studies are unable to match other essential
characteristics of the data-such as the evolution of the real exchange rate (Engel, 2016).
Third, other studies have explored the presence of non-linearities in the Fama regression
equation. The presence of non-linearities was initially justified as the result of transaction
costs (Hollifield and Uppal, 1997) or limits on speculation (Sarno et al., 2006). The
Fama equation is now modified by a smooth transition function that establishes how the
deviations from UIP converge toward zero. The transition function is determined by the
Sharpe ratio (Sarno et al., 2006), the forward premium (Baillie and Kilic, 2006), or other
variables related to foreign exchange traders’ opportunity costs. It is assumed that when
these opportunity costs are high enough, traders carry out exchange transactions that
make UIP possible. The introduction of disaster risk into the UIP condition could also be
captured using non-linear regression models (Ismailov and Rossi, 2018). Finally, members
of the regime-switching model family have been used to examine deviations from CIP -for
instance, threshold autoregressive models have been used by Balke and Wohar (1998),
6This possibility has been modelled by Gourinchas and Tornell (2004).
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and Peel and Taylor (2002).
This paper examines how macroeconomic uncertainty could affect the Fama regression
equation. Uncertainty can affect this equation given its influence on aggregate saving and
investment, financial and credit market conditions, and currency risk. Macroeconomic un-
certainty can affect investment and saving, as greater uncertainty increases the real option
value of postponing non-reversible investment (Bloom et al., 2018) as well as increasing
precautionary saving. Uncertainty can also affect financial market liquidity as portfolio
rebalances and funds move internationally. There is evidence that periods of heightened
macroeconomic uncertainty are associated with lower asset trade volumes (Rehse et al.,
2018) as well as higher bid-ask spreads. Moreover, higher uncertainty affects credit mar-
ket conditions. Uncertainty hurts credit growth, and the severity of this effect depends
on bank capitalization and liquidity conditions (Bordo et al., 2016). Lastly, increased
uncertainty is associated with higher excess returns in currency carry trade operations
(Husted et al., 2018; Berg and Mark, 2018). All these factors suggest that macroeco-
nomic uncertainty is an important omitted variable that could affect the Fama regression
equation in non-linear ways.
We postulate that macroeconomic uncertainty affects the Fama equation by splitting
the sample following a threshold panel regression model. The adoption of this model
reflects the fact that the regression coefficients in the Fama regression are not stable
(Bussie`re et al., 2018) and that uncertainty is a threshold variable that endogenously
splits the sample into two or more regimes. This is a parsimonious way of introducing
uncertainty into the UIP analysis, which allows for differences in the slope and intercept
parameters across regimes (Hansen, 2000).
Our econometric analysis utilizes survey-based exchange rate expectations and news-
based measures of macroeconomic uncertainty. Survey expectations data has enjoyed an
important resurgence in macroeconomics, in part reflecting difficulties with the rational
expectation models. Previous work in open macroeconomics has documented that using
survey-based exchange rate expectations serves to mitigate deviations from UIP (i.e., the
slope coefficient is positive, closer to one, and statistically different from zero) for several
economies (Chinn and Frankel, 2019). We use consensus forecast survey data on exchange
rate expectations whose adequacy for the empirical work is documented in Stavrakeva and
Tang (2015). The news-based measures of economic uncertainty have gained prominence
in macroeconomics research in recent years, and we use the economic policy uncertainty
index (Baker et al., 2016) because of its country coverage and its countercyclicality with
crucial macroeconomic variables. Our database includes information for 14 economies
over the period 2003:1-2018:12, and our baseline is the 3-month Fama regression.
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This paper thus incorporates elements of the different factors identified as possible
explanations of the UIP puzzle. First, by utilizing survey-based exchange rate expecta-
tions, it mitigates potential issues with the ex-post Fama regression literature. Second,
by using a threshold panel regression model, it examines the possibility that uncertainty
is an important omitted variable associated with time-varying risk premia that alters the
Fama regression equation in non-linear ways.
We find that macroeconomic uncertainty is a threshold variable that splits the sample
into two regimes -which we will call “low-uncertainty” and “high-uncertainty”. In the
low-uncertainty regime, the slope coefficient of the Fama regression is not statistically
different from one, which means that the UIP condition holds. In contrast, in the high-
uncertainty regime, the slope coefficient is negative and statistically different from one,
so the UIP condition does not hold. This means that carry trade is profitable; however,
carry trade activity is likely to be limited by the liquidity and credit squeeze that often
characterizes this regime. These results are robust to the inclusion of other controls and
changes in term maturity, proxies of macroeconomic uncertainty, and estimation methods.
Our findings are related to those reported in Ismailov and Rossi (2018), the only
other study we are aware of that examines the effects of uncertainty on UIP for five
industrialized economies over the period 1993:11-2015:1. Their findings, based on single-
country Fama regressions and new exchange-rate uncertainty index, also suggest that
the UIP holds or that deviations from UIP are smaller in less uncertain environments.
They distinguish between low uncertain and high uncertain environments, which they
identify using ad hoc statistical rules applied to the exchange rate uncertainty index before
conducting the regression analysis. Our work complements theirs, in that we use a more
comprehensive dataset and a superior regression framework. We also rely on more widely
used uncertainty measures and survey-based exchange rate expectations.7 Moreover, we
do not a priori impose the existence of two uncertainty regimes, as the number of these
regimes is determined by the data. Lastly, we test whether the slope coefficient estimates
of the Fama regressions in each regime are statistically different from one.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
methodology and dataset we use in this study. In Section 3, we examine the Fama
regression model using a panel threshold framework where macroeconomic uncertainty is
the threshold variable. In Section 4, we discuss certain robustness exercises. Finally, in
Section 5, we conclude with a summary of our findings.
7Ismailov and Rossi (2018) use an exchange rate uncertainty measure that is constructed by comparing
the realized forecast error of the exchange rate with the unconditional forecast error distribution of the
same variable. Their uncertainty measure, however, depends on the Fama regression model used to
forecast exchange rates; for this reason they focus on an ex-post rather than ex-ante estimation.
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2 Methodology and data
In this section, we briefly discuss our methodology and database. We postulate that
macroeconomic uncertainty affects the Fama regression by separating the sample into two
or more regimes. In particular, we embed the Fama equation within a panel threshold
regression model, whereby macroeconomic uncertainty is the threshold variable that splits
the sample. The dataset comprises monthly information for 14 countries over the period
2003:1-2018:12. The data comes from several sources, including Bloomberg, Datastream,
Economic Policy Uncertainty, and Consensus Forecast.
2.1 The Fama equation
The uncovered interest parity condition states that the returns in local currency of an
asset denominated in both local and foreign currency must be equal. Thus, the following
should hold,
(1 + ih,t) = (1 + i
∗
h,t)
EtSt+h
St
, (1)
where ih,t and i
∗
h,t are the domestic and foreign interest rates for a fixed asset that matures
in h periods. St is the spot exchange rate (domestic currency/foreign currency), Et is the
expectation conditional on information in period t and St+h is the spot exchange rate in
t+h. Taking the logarithms to both sides of equation (1) and ignoring Jensen’s inequality,
we obtain the following linear equation, which is known as the Fama regression equation
Etst+h − st = ih,t − i
∗
h,t, (2)
where st+h is the spot exchange rate in logs in t+ h.
To estimate the Fama regression equation, we need a proxy for exchange rate expecta-
tions. In the empirical literature, two such proxies have been used. The most common one
is the ex-post exchange rate expectation. Proceeding this way, the null is a joint hypoth-
esis of UIP and rational expectations. However, as noted earlier, there is ample evidence
to suggest that rational expectations do not hold. This has prompted several researchers
to use survey-based exchange rate expectations. For instance, Bussie`re et al. (2018), and
Chinn and Frankel (2019) find that when using survey-based data, the deviations from
UIP are much smaller than those resulting from ex-post expectations. In this paper, we
utilize the survey-based exchange rate expectations obtained from the Consensus Fore-
cast. There is evidence that this survey data does not follow mechanical rules associated
with either the forward exchange rate or interest rate differentials (Stavrakeva and Tang,
2015).
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The ex-ante Fama regression equation for a given country is now given by (Bussie`re et
al., 2018)
ŝt+h − st = α + β(ih,t − i
∗
h,t) + et+h, (3)
where ŝt+h is the survey-based exchange rate expectation and et+h is an error term. When
the survey-based exchange rate expectations are not biased, i.e., they have mean zero,
then et+h also has mean zero. From now on, we will assume that this is the case. When
the intercept α is equal to zero, and the slope β is equal to 1, then the UIP hypothesis
holds in the data. In more realistic settings, however, the intercept might be different from
zero; for instance, when there are differentiated and time-invariant taxes to the domestic
and foreign currency deposits, constant risk aversion, among other scenarios.
The ex-ante Fama panel regression equation is
ŝit+h − sit = µi + α + β(ih,it − i
∗
h,it) + eit+h, (4)
where the sub-index i refers to country i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and µi is an unobserved country-
specific effect which is assumed to be fixed. Equation (4) is a Fama panel regression model
that allows us to capture common parameters and to control for country-unobservable
characteristics persistent over time.
We focus on panel regression models for three main reasons. First, panel data regres-
sion models allow for more accurate inference of model parameters, since they usually
contain more degrees of freedom and more sample variability than time-series data, thus
improving the efficiency of econometric estimates (Hsiao, 2007) and the model of predictive
performance (Mark, 2012).8 Second, panel data regression models allow country-specific
omitted variables to be controlled for. Those are variables that we cannot observe or mea-
sure, or which are available at a low frequency. Examples of such variable include financial
market structures and differential taxation, among others. Third, macroeconomic models
are inherently dynamic. With the panel regression model, we can rely on inter-individual
differences to reduce the correlation between a given variable and its lags (Hsiao, 2007).
Note that the Fama regression equation is not itself dynamic, as it does not include the
dependent variable as a regressor.
2.2 The threshold Fama panel regression model
We initially postulate that macroeconomic uncertainty affects the ex-ante Fama panel
regression by splitting the sample into two regimes. Thus, the resulting ex-ante threshold
8One important potential drawback of using panel data is the need to impose the same slope parameter
for all countries, when these countries are very heterogenous.
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Fama panel regression model is given by
ŝit+h−sit = µi+(α1+β1(ih,it−i
∗
h,it))1(qit ≤ γ)+(α2+β2(ih,it−i
∗
h,it))1(qit > γ)+eit+h, (5)
where qit stands for macroeconomic uncertainty in country i and period t (threshold
variable), γ is the threshold parameter which needs to be estimated along with the other
parameters in the regression equation, and 1(.) is the indicator function, which takes on
the value of 1 if the inequality inside the bracket is true, and 0 otherwise. In this model
the marginal effect of interest rate differentials is given by
∂(ŝit+h − sit)
∂(ih,it − i∗h,it)
=
{
β1 if qit < γ
β2 if qit ≥ γ,
(6)
where β1 could be different from β2; that is, the slopes could differ across regimes.
The empirical analysis of these models involves three steps: estimation, inference, and
testing. The estimation and inference theory for these models is developed in Hansen
(2000). In particular, the latter develops a method to construct confidence intervals for
the threshold parameter, γ, in a simple closed-form expression. Hansen (1999) extends
these methods to a balanced panel data context. After estimating model (5), we need
to test whether the threshold parameter is statistically significant, whether α1 = α2 and
β1 = β2 which is the hypothesis of no threshold effect, and whether each β = 1, which
is the hypothesis of UIP. We expect the deviations from UIP to be smaller in the low
uncertainty regime, when qit < γ, than in the high uncertainty regime, when qit ≥ γ.
Next, we need to determine the number of uncertainty thresholds in this model. To this
end, we perform a set of sequential tests -a test of no threshold against one threshold, a test
of one threshold versus two thresholds, a test of two thresholds versus three thresholds,
and so on. We can proceed this way because the regimes in this framework are observable
ex-post.
Threshold regression models have been very popular in applied econometrics for many
years now. Our interest in these models reflects our conviction that certain economic rela-
tionships are better characterized by non-linear specifications. In particular, the threshold
regression models provide a versatile and straightforward framework to model the rela-
tionship between a threshold-dependent variable and another variable. The regression
sample is split into two or more “regimes” based on the threshold value of an observed
variable qit, and the regression coefficients are allowed to differ across regions.
Our framework is more general than the one used by Ismailov and Rossi (2018). First,
we apply the sample split jointly to the estimation of the Fama regression parameters, in
contrast to the exogenous sample split following ad hoc rules that these authors perform.
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Second, in our framework, the number of regimes in which the sample could be split might
exceed two -as dictated by the sample. Third, we are using a panel regression with fixed
effects, which in comparison with a country-specific regression model should deliver better
results when the country sample is not that heterogenous. Lastly, we estimate an ex-ante
Fama regression model as opposed to an ex-post Fama regression model.
Parameters estimation
The within transformation suggested by Hansen (1999) is given by
(ŝit+h − sit)
+ = (α1 − α2)1(qit ≤ γ)
+ + β1(ih,it − i
∗
h,it)
+ + β2(ih,it − i
∗
h,it)
± + e+it+h, (7)
where (ŝit+h − sit)
+ = ŝit+h − sit − T
−1
∑T
t=1(ŝit+h − sit), 1(qit ≤ γ)
+ = 1(qit ≤ γ) −
T−1
∑T
t=1 1(qit ≤ γ), (ih,it−i
∗
h,it)
+ = (ih,it−i
∗
h,it)1(qit ≤ γ)−T
−1
∑T
t=1(ih,it−i
∗
h,it)1(qit ≤ γ),
(ih,it − i
∗
h,it)
± = (ih,it − i
∗
h,it)1(qit > γ) − T
−1
∑T
t=1(ih,it − i
∗
h,it)1(qit > γ), and e
+
it+h =
eit+h − T
−1
∑T
t=1 eit+h; note that this latter equation is simply the original threshold
panel regression model (5) after removing individual-specific means.9
Next, let
Xi(γ) =

1(qi1 ≤ γ)
+ (ih,i1 − i
∗
h,i1)
+ (ih,i1 − i
∗
h,i1)
±
1(qi2 ≤ γ)
+ (ih,i2 − i
∗
h,i2)
+ (ih,i2 − i
∗
h,i2)
±
...
1(qiT ≤ γ)
+ (ih,iT − i
∗
h,iT )
+ (ih,iT − i
∗
h,iT )
±
 ;
Yi =

(ŝi1+h − si1)
+
(ŝi2+h − si2)
+
...
(ŝiT+h − siT )
+
 ; and e+i =

e+i1+h
e+i2+h
...
e+iT+h
 ;
be the stacked mean corrected data and error terms for a given country i. Then, the
stacked data and errors for the panel data model (7) are given by
9Note that given the nature of the panel threshold model, α1 and α2 cannot be recovered directly.
that is, because the within transformation produces α1(1(qit ≤ γ) − T
−1
∑
T
t=1
1(qit ≤ γ)) + α2(1(qit >
γ) − T−1
∑
T
t=1
1(qit > γ)) = (α1 − α2)(1(qit ≤ γ) − T
−1
∑
T
t=1
1(qit ≤ γ)), whereas we use the fact that
1(qit > γ) = 1− 1(qit ≤ γ).
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Y =

Y1
Y2
...
Yn
 ;X(γ) =

X1(γ)
X2(γ)
...
Xn(γ)
 ; and e =

e+1
e+2
...
e+n
 .
The estimation procedure involves several steps starting from a given γ, within the
empirical support of the threshold variable -in our case the macroeconomic uncertainty
variable. The coefficients α1 − α2, β1, and β2 can then be estimated using ordinary least
squares, conditional on the given value for γ
θ̂(γ) = (X(γ)′X(γ))−1X(γ)′Y, (8)
where θ = (α1 − α2, β1, β2)
′, and the regression residuals are given by
ê(γ) = Y −X(γ)θ̂(γ); (9)
finally, the sum of squared errors to be minimized is
S(γ) = ê(γ)′ê(γ). (10)
The minimization of this sum of squared errors is carried out using a grid search over
the threshold variable space, as proposed by Hansen (2000). This involves constructing
an evenly spaced grid on the empirical support of macroeconomic uncertainty, qit, and
minimizing the concentrated sum of squared errors (10). Finally, once γ̂ the optimal
threshold parameter, is obtained, the slope coefficient estimates are α̂1 − α̂2 = α̂1(γ̂) −
α̂2(γ̂), β̂1 = β̂1(γ̂), and β̂2 = β̂2(γ̂). It is important to note that other more conventional
gradient algorithms are not applicable to this case as the criterion function (10) is generally
not smooth.
Inference
When there is a threshold effect (α1 6= α2) or (β1 6= β2), then the threshold estimate γ̂ is
a consistent estimator for γ0 (the true value of γ), and it has an asymptotic distribution,
which is nonstandard (Hansen, 2000). Thus, the best way to produce confidence intervals
for the threshold parameter is to form the no rejection region using the likelihood ratio
statistic for the test on γ̂ (Hansen, 2000). To test the null hypothesis H0: γ = γ0, the
likelihood ratio test is to reject large values of LR(γ0) where
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LR(γ) = nT
S(γ)− S(γ̂)
S(γ̂)
, (11)
where S(γ) is defined in (10), and nT is the sample size.
The LR test converges in distribution as n → ∞, for a fixed T , to a random variable
ξ with distribution function P (ξ ≤ z) = (1− exp(−z/2))2. Furthermore, the distribution
function ξ has the inverse
c(ρ) = −2ln(1−
√
1− ρ), (12)
where ρ is the significance level. The “no-rejection region” for a confidence level 1− ρ is
the set of values of γ such that LR(γ) ≤ c(α). This is found by plotting LR(γ) against γ
and drawing a flat line at c(α).
With regard to the estimates of the slope parameters, the panel threshold regression
model conditional on a given threshold parameter is just a linear regression model. There-
fore the asymptotic distribution of the estimates of the slope parameters converges to the
traditional normal distribution as n→∞, for a fixed T .
Testing for threshold effects
It is critical to determine whether the threshold effect is statistically significant or not. The
null hypothesis of no threshold effects in (4) can be represented by the linear constraint
H0 : α1 = α2 and β1 = β2. However, under the null hypothesis, H0, the threshold γ is
not identified, so classical tests have non-standard distributions. For this reason, Hansen
(1999, 2000), suggest a bootstrap to simulate the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood
ratio test for this model so that the p-values constructed from the bootstrap procedure
are asymptotically valid.
Hence, under the null hypothesis of no threshold, the panel data model (4) is
ŝit+h − sit = µi + α1 + β1(ih,it − i
∗
h,it) + eit+h, (13)
where the parameter β1 can be estimated using ordinary least squares (after making the
within transformation), yielding estimate of β̂1, and residuals ê. Let S0 = ê
′ê be the sum
of squared residuals of the linear panel data model. In this case, the likelihood ratio test
of H0 is based on
F = nT
S0 − S(γ̂)
S(γ̂)
; (14)
moreover, the null hypothesis is rejected if the percentage of draws for which the simulated
statistic exceeds the actual value is less than a given critical value.
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2.3 Data
We collect data for a sample of advanced and emerging market economies. The coun-
try composition of this sample is determined by data availability. In particular, we are
constrained by the availability of the macroeconomic uncertainty variable, which is a cru-
cial variable in this project. Another constraint is the need for a balanced panel as the
threshold model cannot yet be estimated for an unbalanced panel.
Our database comprises monthly information for fourteen countries or regions for the
period 2003:1-2018:12. The list of countries includes Australia, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, the European Union (which we treat as a country), Hong Kong, India, Japan,
Korea, Mexico, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Our baseline regression re-
quires information on the following variables: spot bilateral exchange rates, survey-based
bilateral exchange rate forecasts, three-month deposit interest rates on domestic and for-
eign currencies, and domestic and foreign macroeconomic uncertainty. The database starts
in 2003:01, as for some countries there is no macroeconomic uncertainty data available
before this date.
The spot exchange rates and the three-month domestic and foreign currency deposit
interest rates were obtained from Bloomberg and Datastream, the exchange rate forecasts
from the Consensus Forecast, and the domestic and foreign uncertainties from the Eco-
nomic Policy Uncertainty website. In all cases but Sweden, foreign currency refers to the
US dollar. In the case of Sweden, foreign currency refers to the euro. This is because
the anchor or reference currency for the countries in the sample is either the dollar or the
euro (see, for instance, Ilzetzki et al., 2019). Table 1 reports summary statistics for each
country, for averages across currencies, and the pooled data.
As in several UIP studies, we use the deposit interest rate in domestic currency since
residents usually favor such deposits. One concern with these rates is that they can be
affected by capital controls, regulations, and local taxes. However, with the advent of
financial integration, these distortions have become less important. This is particularly
true for the sample of countries and period included in this study. In other studies (see,
for example, Bussie`re et al., 2018), offshore interest rates are utilized. Unfortunately,
these interest rates are only available for a small number of countries and periods.
As noted earlier, in this study we focus on the ex-ante Fama regression model. We
do so because we are using survey-based exchange rate expectations and, thus, we drop
the assumption of rational expectations. Other papers that use survey-based exchange
rate data include Bussie`re et al. (2018) and Chinn and Frankel (2019). The survey-
based exchange rate expectations are obtained from Consensus Forecast. The consensus
forecast in period t, for a given country and variable, is a simple average of the forecasts
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for that period provided by each participating forecaster. Each consensus forecast report
is usually the result of the surveys of several international and local economists. Some of
these economists represent global firms such as Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and HSBC
or regional branches such as Citigroup Japan, while others are more country-specific, such
as the University of Toronto in the case of Canada.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Expected exchange rate change Interest rate differentials Economic uncertainty
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Australia 5.3 10.7 -26.2 37.0 2.4 1.5 -0.8 5.1 102.4 61.2 25.7 337.0
Canada 1.4 6.7 -18.8 23.1 0.2 0.8 -1.5 2.2 162.2 91.2 40.4 449.6
Chile 2.3 10.7 -45.4 27.4 2.2 1.9 -0.4 6.5 99.6 43.1 31.6 282.8
China -2.0 5.1 -13.6 13.6 1.8 2.4 -3.2 6.5 177.5 144.8 26.1 935.3
Colombia 5.7 14.4 -40.7 52.6 4.3 1.7 0.7 8.5 98.3 36.4 35.6 256.8
European Union 2.6 7.6 -14.7 21.7 -0.4 1.2 -3.2 2.1 156.4 68.0 47.7 433.3
Hong Kong 0.4 0.8 -1.3 2.6 -0.4 0.5 -2.1 0.2 134.5 65.9 31.5 425.4
India -1.0 6.6 -23.5 14.3 5.4 2.5 0.4 10.6 94.0 52.1 24.9 283.7
Japan 0.2 10.4 -28.0 24.6 -1.5 1.6 -5.1 -0.1 103.7 32.9 48.4 236.8
Korea -2.0 8.4 -39.0 24.7 1.8 1.5 -0.7 4.9 133.9 61.3 37.3 391.8
Mexico 0.2 11.0 -40.4 30.0 3.5 1.2 0.2 5.9 71.1 54.2 8.5 428.7
Singapore -0.4 6.2 -14.7 20.3 -0.6 0.9 -3.4 0.6 122.7 56.9 47.9 351.3
Sweden -5.4 5.2 -23.6 12.6 0.2 0.6 -0.6 1.9 91.9 19.4 53.7 156.7
United Kingdom 2.7 7.1 -16.9 22.3 0.6 1.2 -1.9 3.3 218.1 159.0 30.5 1141.8
Average 0.7 7.9 -24.8 23.4 1.4 1.4 -1.5 4.2 126.2 67.6 35.0 436.5
Pool 0.7 9.0 -45.4 52.6 1.4 2.5 -5.1 10.6 126.2 86.8 8.5 1141.8
Notes: Annualized values (percent). SD stands for standard deviation.
The consensus forecast has been widely used in many empirical studies; this survey data
is found to be more precise than the random walk forecast and the forward rate forecast
(Novotny´ and Rakova´, 2011) and that do not follow rules of thumb related to interest
rate differentials or the forward exchange rate (Stavrakeva and Tang, 2015). Moreover,
Batchelor (2001) finds that the Consensus Economics provide better forecasts -in terms of
mean absolute error and root mean square error- than those provided by the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development and International Monetary Fund.
Macroeconomic uncertainty is proxied by the news-based index of economic policy
uncertainty (EPU). This index (Baker et al., 2016), originally developed for the United
States, reflects newspaper reporting frequency of the following three items: (1) “economy”
or “economic”; (2) “uncertain” or “uncertainty”; and (3) “deficit”, “Federal Reserve”,
“legislation” or “White House”. The index was relatively low in the run-up to the Great
Recession, with an average of 90 in the period 2003:1-2008:8, and remained relatively
high during the recovery from this recession, with an average of 139 in the period 2008:9-
2018:12. Similar indexes have been constructed for twenty-four countries around the
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world. Several of these countries, however, are members of the European Union. As
mentioned, the EPU is available for some countries starting in 2003:1. Because of these
considerations and other data problems in a few countries, we end up with a sample of
fourteen countries for the period 2003:1-2018:12. We have chosen the EPU over other
uncertainty indicators because of its coverage, timeliness, and popularity in empirical
macroeconomics.
To assess the robustness of our main findings, we use information about capital controls,
exchange rate regimes, inflation rates, and terms of trade. These variables are likely to
affect the time-varying risk premium (Farhi and Werning, 2014) and, thus, the UIP in
a framework with risk-averse agents. The capital controls information is obtained from
Ferna´ndez et al. (2016). In particular, we use the overall restrictions index -which is an
average of the overall inflow restrictions index and the overall outflow restrictions index.
The values of the overall restrictions index are between 0 and 1, where 0 means that there
are no capital inflow or outflow restrictions, and 1 means that there are many capital
inflow and outflow restrictions.
Given that capital inflows or outflow restrictions are slow-moving variables, we have
assumed that the monthly data is the same as the yearly. The exchange rate regime data
is obtained from Ilzetzki et al. (2019). They use a two-step procedure to determine the
de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility. First, they determine the anchor currency
for each country with the help of algorithms based on exchange rate volatility. Second,
they produce a measure of exchange rate flexibility using the information on the parallel
exchange market or the unified exchange rate market. Then, they classify exchange rates
based on the probability of the parallel (unified) exchange rate being outside a threshold
within a five-year window, and provided that the inflation rate is not higher than 40
percent. We have used the fine measure of exchange rates with values between 0 to 15.
Inflation rates are calculated based on each country’s consumer price index (CPI),
obtained from the IMF’s International Finance Statistics. For most countries, CPI data is
collected with a monthly frequency, which allows us to calculate the twelve-month inflation
rates.10 Then, we use this information to construct the inflation differential of each country
vis-a`-vis its anchor country. Lastly, information on each country’s commodity terms of
trade is obtained from Gruss and Kebhaj (2019). They construct this database using the
international price variation of up to forty-five commodities, which are rolling weighted
using information on each country’s commodity trade data. The data is monthly and
covers the period 1980:1-2018:12.
10For Australia, we mensualize the quarterly data. For Hong Kong and Singapore we complement
the CPI data with information from Hong Kong’s Census and Statistics Department and Sigapore’s
Department of Statistics, respectively.
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3 An empirical investigation of uncertainty and UIP
In this section, we discuss our main empirical findings on the relationship between eco-
nomic uncertainty and the UIP. However, before doing so, we need to assess whether the
key variables in the Fama regression equation are stationary or not, as this can affect the
inference. We have a panel database with a much larger time dimension in relation to
the number of countries (192 months for 14 countries). In Table 2, we show the most
important unit-root tests developed in the unit-root and cointegration literature. In the
case of the panel unit root tests, the evidence rejects the null hypothesis of a common
unit root process. Moreover, in the individual unit root test, all but one of the tests
suggest that these variables are stationary. These latter tests usually exhibit more power
than the previous one as each variable is assumed to follow a unit root process under the
null. On this basis we conclude that the key variables in the Fama regression equation
are stationary.
Table 2: Panel unit-root tests (p-values)
Expected exchange Observed exchange Interest rate Economic
Method rate change rate change differentials uncertainty
Null hypothesis: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000
PP - Fisher Chi-square 0.0000 0.0000 0.3695 0.0000
Null hypothesis: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin and Chu t-stat 0.0000 0.0504 0.0648 0.0000
Breitung t-stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4078
Note: The tests were performed with an intercept in the specification. For the optimal lag length
selection, the Akaike information criterion was used.
In principle, macroeconomic uncertainty could arise from two important sources: do-
mestic or foreign. Both kinds of uncertainties could potentially have different implications
over the Fama regression equation. Although there are several possible combinations, in
our baseline scenarios, we use domestic (Country EPU), foreign (Anchored EPU), and
weighted average uncertainty. The weights for each country are chosen so as to mini-
mize the sum of squared residuals of a country-threshold Fama regression model. We
use two weighted averages. The first one (Weighted 1 EPU) uses the weights obtained
from country regressions using data covering the period 2003:01-2018:12. The second one
(Weighted 2 EPU) uses the weights obtained from country regressions using the largest
possible span, as for some of the countries the data start before 2003.
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3.1 Estimation with an imposed ad hoc threshold
We start by reporting the regression results, using an arbitrarily chosen macroeconomic
uncertainty threshold. Table 3 shows, in particular, the results of splitting the regression
sample into two uncertainty regimes: “high uncertainty”, which corresponds to the top
quartile of the macroeconomic uncertainty values; and “low uncertainty”, which includes
the rest of the observations (as in Ismailov and Rossi, 2018). We focus on the slope
coefficient, as the intercept drops out after the within-transformation of the model.
The first column reports the results of estimating an ex-ante standard Fama regres-
sion equation where uncertainty does not play any role. Consistent with the previous
literature (Chinn and Frankel, 2019), in this case, the slope coefficient is positive (0.47)
but statistically different from one. Next, when we split the sample into high and low
uncertainty regimes following the ad hoc rule above, we obtain the following results. In
the “low uncertainty” regime, the estimates of the slope coefficient are positive and not
significantly different from one, except when using the second uncertainty measure (An-
chored EPU). In the “high uncertainty” regime, the estimate of the slope coefficient is
negative and significantly different from one. These results are broadly in line with those
reported in Ismailov and Rossi (2018).
Table 3: Panel data estimation with an imposed threshold
Linear estimation Threshold estimation
Country EPU Anchored EPU Weighted 1 EPU Weighted 2 EPU
β̂ 0.473** - - - -
(0.166)
α̂1 − α̂2 - -0.020** -0.010** -0.017** -0.012**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Low uncertainty
β̂1 - 0.761 0.698* 0.767 0.834
(0.174) (0.169) (0.172) (0.171)
High uncertainty
β̂2 - -0.425** -0.226** -0.494** -0.463**
(0.211) (0.228) (0.232) (0.214)
Threshold - 150.449 154.763 160.259 154.432
Observations 2674 2674 2674 2674 2674
Countries 14 14 14 14 14
Period 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses, lag length is
set to T
1
4 . * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 1 percent level, respectively, for the individual
null hypotheses of an intercept equal to zero and a slope equal to 1. Weighted 1 and Weighted 2 are computed by
minimizing the sum of squared residuals for each country in its own and the common samples, respectively.
However, these findings raise important questions. First, is it justified to split the
sample into two ad hoc regimes? In other words, is the threshold Fama regression model
superior to the Fama regression model? Second, is the optimal uncertainty threshold
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value that which splits the sample between the top uncertainty quartile and the rest, as
in Ismailov and Rossi (2018)? Third, can the presence of more than two regimes be ruled
out? In the next subsection, we discuss these questions.
3.2 Test for threshold effects
Are there macroeconomic uncertainty threshold effects in the Fama regression equation?
To address this question, we need to test for the existence of a threshold effect in the
panel Fama regression equation using the F test given in equation (14). This step typ-
ically involves estimating equation (5) and computing the residual sum of squares for
the different uncertainty threshold. We conduct the test for the existence of uncertainty
threshold effects using a sample of fourteen countries over the period 2003:01-2018:12.
We use 1000 bootstrap replications to perform the threshold effect tests.
The results of the test for threshold effects are shown in Table 4. The null hypothesis of
no threshold effect against a single threshold can be rejected in all cases at the five percent
significance level, and in all but one case at the one percent significance level. For instance,
the F test statistic for a single threshold when using the domestic (foreign) uncertainty as
a threshold variable is 93.6 (81.9), with a bootstrap p-value of 0.005 (0.059). These results
indicate that the test for an uncertainty threshold is highly significant regardless of the
uncertainty proxy. Therefore, there is strong evidence that macroeconomic uncertainty
affects the Fama equation by splitting the regression sample into two regimes. In addition,
we perform tests for the existence of two or more threshold effects, which implies that the
sample should be split into three or more uncertainty regimes. These tests, which are not
reported here, suggest that there are no additional thresholds beyond the one we have
reported.
3.3 Confidence interval of the threshold estimate
Next, we construct a confidence interval for the estimated uncertainty threshold. In
particular, the point estimates of the threshold parameter and their asymptotic 90 and 99
percent confidence intervals are reported in Table 5 for the four uncertainty proxies. The
two regimes separated by the threshold estimate are denoted as low and high uncertainty
regimes, respectively. The asymptotic confidence intervals for the threshold parameter are
tight, which indicates high precision in the estimation. Note that the threshold estimates
and the corresponding confidence interval are much smaller than those obtained under
the ad hoc rule (3), suggesting the unfitness of the later.
Additional information about the threshold estimates, and their confidence intervals,
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Table 4: Tests for threshold effects
Threshold Test Bootstrap Critical
estimate F p-value values
Country uncertainty as 115.930 93.595 0.005 41.6121/
a threshold variable 51.4882/
83.1603/
Anchored uncertainty as 84.549 81.900 0.059 66.8771/
a threshold variable 85.6302/
139.5433/
Weighted 1 uncertainty 114.316 107.603 0.005 44.8461/
as a threshold variable 55.8692/
89.4733/
Weighted 2 uncertainty 114.676 117.249 0.004 44.6041/
as a threshold variable 57.9022/
97.6453/
Note: 1/, 2/ and 3/ critical values at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. We
used 1000 bootstrap replications for the test.
Table 5: Asymptotic confidence interval in threshold model
Threshold variable Threshold estimate 90% confidence interval 99% confidence interval
Country uncertainty 115.930 [99.657 ; 120.577] [97.584 ; 122.661]
Anchored uncertainty 84.549 [82.686 ; 89.915] [78.506 ; 91.438]
Weighted 1 uncertainty 114.316 [75.486 ; 129.419] [75.184 ; 129.938]
Weighted 2 uncertainty 114.676 [114.676 ; 128.112] [113.014 ; 128.563]
is provided in Figure 1. We obtain the two panels by plotting the concentrated likelihood
ratio function LR(γ) of the threshold parameter when using the domestic and foreign
uncertainty proxies, respectively. The function is minimized at zero when the estimated
thresholds are γ̂ = 115.9 and γ̂ = 84.6. We obtain similar results when using the weighted
uncertainty measures. The estimation precision is high because the 90 percent confidence
interval, the set of values below the dotted line in Figure 1, is rather small across the
threshold parameter space. None of the 90 percent confidence intervals include the ad hoc
threshold obtained from using the procedure in Ismailov and Rossi (2018).
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Figure 1: Confidence interval construction for threshold
(a) Estimation with country uncertainty (b) Estimation with anchored uncertainty
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3.4 Slope estimation results
In the panel threshold Fama regression model, the slope coefficients in the two uncertainty
regimes should be different. Table 6 reports the estimates of the slope coefficient for the
low uncertainty and high uncertainty regimes. In the low uncertainty regime, the estimate
of the slope coefficient is not significantly different from one at the one percent level in all
but the foreign uncertainty proxy scenario. In contrast, in the high uncertainty regime,
the estimate of the slope coefficient is negative (except for the foreign uncertainty proxy)
and significantly different from one in all cases. This finding confirms our a priori belief
that the deviations from UIP tend to be more severe in more uncertain regimes.
The results also suggest that macroeconomic uncertainty in the anchoring country
does not seem as important as domestic uncertainty. First, there is evidence of a strong
threshold effect (significant at the one percent level) when using the domestic and weighted
average proxies of macroeconomic uncertainty. The evidence is weaker when using the
foreign uncertainty proxy, whereby the threshold effect is significant at the 10 percent
level. Second, the estimates of the slope parameters suggest different conclusions when
using the domestic and weighted average proxies of macroeconomic uncertainty vis-a`-vis
the foreign one. In the first case, there is acceptance of the UIP condition; in the latter,
it is rejected.
The point estimates of the slope coefficient in the threshold regression models are
higher and closer to one than those observed using the ad hoc threshold model. Why
would domestic uncertainty be more important than foreign uncertainty? In principle,
there are no good theoretical reasons why this should be so. It seems that in the panel,
survey-based exchange rate forecast and interest rate differentials are more reactive to
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Table 6: Panel data estimation with an estimated threshold
Linear estimation Threshold estimation
Country EPU Anchored EPU Weighted 1 EPU Weighted 2 EPU
β̂ 0.473** - - - -
(0.166)
α̂1 − α̂2 - -0.021** -0.023** -0.018** -0.016**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Low uncertainty
β̂1 - 1.031 1.501* 1.128 1.134
(0.175) (0.267) (0.177) (0.174)
High uncertainty
β̂2 - -0.390** 0.009** -0.297** -0.337**
(0.185) (0.178) (0.184) (0.182)
Threshold estimate - 115.930 84.549 114.316 114.676
99% confidence interval - [97.6 , 122.7] [78.5 , 91.4] [75.2 , 129.9] [113.0 , 128.6]
Test for threshold effects - 0.005 0.059 0.005 0.004
Observations 2674 2674 2674 2674 2674
Countries 14 14 14 14 14
Period 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses, lag length is set
to T
1
4 . The test for threshold effects shows the probability value for the null hypothesis of α̂1 = α̂2 and β̂1 = β̂2; we
used 1000 bootstrap replications for the test. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 1 percent level,
respectively, for the individual null hypotheses of an intercept equal to zero and a slope equal to 1.
changes in domestic uncertainty than in foreign ones, as the latter is common to virtually
all the countries in the sample.
The evidence also suggests that the panel threshold Fama regression model is preferred
to the panel Fama regression one. In all cases, the null hypothesis of a Fama linear model
is rejected in favor of the threshold regression Fama model with two regimes, whereby
the slope estimates in each regime are statistically different from each other. It is worth
noting that the difference in constant estimates is significantly different from zero; as
mentioned earlier, a non-zero constant is usually related to the presence of differentiated
taxes, constant exchange risk premium, among other variables.
3.5 Importance of high and low uncertainty regimes
These findings beg the following questions: what fraction of the observations belong to
each uncertainty regime? Which countries are more susceptible to experiencing a high
uncertainty regime? Table 7 provides information that addresses these questions for the
different proxies of macroeconomic uncertainty. First, for the domestic and weighted
average uncertainty proxies, the model establishes that between 40.8 and 50 percent of
the observations in the sample belong to the high uncertainty regime. This fraction is
much higher than the 25 percent assumed in Ismailov and Rossi (2018). The foreign
uncertainty proxy, in contrast, suggests that 80 percent of the sample correspond to the
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high uncertainty regime.
Second, in terms of the individual countries, we note that more than 60 percent of the
observations for Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom are in the high
uncertainty regime. In contrast, more than 60 percent of the observations for Chile and
India are in the low uncertainty regime. These results are consistent since most of the
observations pertain to the post-Great Recession period, as we will discuss. As noted
earlier, there is evidence of important deviations of the CIP during this period.
Table 7: Percentage of observations in each regime by country
Variable Country uncertainty Anchored uncertainty Weighted 1 uncertainty Weighted 2 uncertainty
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Australia 70.8 29.2 20.3 79.7 54.2 45.8 64.6 35.4
Canada 37.0 63.0 20.3 79.7 43.8 56.3 42.2 57.8
Chile 72.4 27.6 20.3 79.7 69.3 30.7 70.8 29.2
China 46.4 53.6 20.3 79.7 45.8 54.2 45.8 54.2
Colombia 72.9 27.1 20.3 79.7 62.0 38.0 53.1 46.9
European Union 32.3 67.7 20.3 79.7 30.7 69.3 37.0 63.0
Hong Kong 44.8 55.2 20.3 79.7 44.8 55.2 45.8 54.2
India 72.9 27.1 20.3 79.7 71.4 28.6 71.9 28.1
Japan 68.8 31.3 20.3 79.7 62.0 38.0 57.3 42.7
Korea 45.3 54.7 20.3 79.7 43.8 56.3 44.8 55.2
Mexico 91.7 8.3 20.3 79.7 59.4 40.6 67.7 32.3
Singapore 54.2 45.8 20.3 79.7 53.1 46.9 53.1 46.9
Sweden 90.6 9.4 15.6 84.4 30.7 69.3 30.7 69.3
United Kingdom 29.2 70.8 20.3 79.7 28.6 71.4 53.1 46.9
Full sample 59.2 40.8 20.0 80.0 50.0 50.0 52.7 47.3
What is the time pattern of these uncertainty regimes? Figure 2 shows the evolution
over time of the fraction of countries in the high uncertainty regime. We focus on the
cases where we use the domestic and weighted uncertainty proxies. The charts suggest
that the low uncertainty regime is mostly concentrated in the period of the run-up to
the Great Recession, except for a short bout of uncertainty in 2003, which is consistent
with the literature on the great moderation. The high uncertainty regime is, in contrast,
concentrated in the period around and following the Great Recession. This is certainly
the case of Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. The post-Great
Recession period, however, does not show a uniform pattern-as months of high uncertainty
are followed by months of low uncertainty. Bussie`re et al. (2018), also report a break in
their Fama regression results, starting with the great financial crisis. However, they do
not link this break to uncertainty since they use a linear model.
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Figure 2: Percentage of contries in a high uncertainty regime over time
(a) Country uncertainty (b) Anchored uncertainty
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4 Robustness
In this section, we examine the robustness of our main findings to the inclusion of addi-
tional controls, and to changes in the maturity of the asset and the estimation method.
4.1 Adding additional control variables
As noted earlier, some argue that the failure of UIP might be due to the omission of certain
regressors that could be related to the risk premium. In this section, we examine five of
these variables: macroeconomic uncertainty, capital controls, exchange rate flexibility,
inflation differentials, terms of trade, and global common factors.
In addition to using macroeconomic uncertainty as a threshold variable, we include
uncertainty as an additional regressor. This will allow us to assess whether uncertainty
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has a significant effect on the expected change in the nominal exchange rate beyond its
effect as a threshold variable. Bussie`re et al. (2018) include the VIX as an additional
regressor to explore this possibility. Table 8 reports the main results of this exercise. The
estimate of the uncertainty parameter is positive and statistically significant (different
from zero), albeit numerically unimportant, in the relevant cases. Moreover, the slope
estimates of UIP are closer to 1 than our benchmark estimates reported in Table 6. This
suggests that uncertainty affects the Fama regression model mainly through its effect as
a threshold variable.
Table 8: Panel data estimation with uncertainty as a regressor
Linear estimation Threshold estimation
Country EPU Anchored EPU Weighted 1 EPU Weighted 2 EPU
Uncertainty/1000 0.041* 0.048* -0.152* 0.057** 0.023
(0.024) (0.027) (0.055) (0.031) (0.045)
β̂ 0.445** - - - -
(0.165) - - - -
α̂1 − α̂2 - -0.015** -0.035** -0.011* -0.014**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Low uncertainty
β̂1 - 1.026 1.432* 1.056 1.125
(0.175) (0.252) (0.172) (0.175)
High uncertainty
β̂2 - -0.376** 0.007** -0.403** -0.345**
(0.185) (0.176) (0.190) (0.182)
Threshold estimate - 115.930 85.969 128.525 114.676
99% confidence interval - [100.4 , 122.7] [84.5 , 96.4] [75.5 , 129.9] [113.0 , 129.9]
Test for threshold effects - 0.002 0.054 0.001 0.002
Observations 2674 2674 2674 2674 2674
Countries 14 14 14 14 14
Period 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses, lag length is set
to T
1
4 . The test for threshold effects shows the probability value for the null hypothesis of α̂1 = α̂2 and β̂1 = β̂2;
we used 1000 bootstrap replications for the test. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 1 percent
level, respectively, for the individual null hypotheses of an intercept equal to zero and a slope equal to 1. The linear
estimation includes the own country uncertainty; the others uncertainty measures give pretty similar results. For
the additional control, the null is that its coefficient estimate is equal to zero.
Next, we include capital controls as an additional regressor in the Fama equation.
Capital controls have been used by countries, regardless of their exchange rate regimes,
to mitigate the exchange rate effects of a sudden stop or a capital inflow surge. Farhi
and Werning (2014) show that this policy makes sense even in the economies with flexible
exchange rate regimes, as optimal capital controls take the form of temporary taxes when
there are outflows and subsidies when there are inflows -thus helping mitigate the effect
on the nominal exchange rate. When we include the proxy of international capital control
restrictions developed by Ferna´ndez et al. (2016) as a regressor, we find evidence that these
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controls tend to appreciate the domestic currency. This effect is statistically significant
(different from zero; Table 9). Despite this, the importance of macroeconomic uncertainty
as a threshold variable remains unchanged from our baseline regression.
Table 9: Panel data estimation with capital control indicator as a regressor
Linear estimation Threshold estimation
Country EPU Anchored EPU Weighted 1 EPU Weighted 2 EPU
Capital control -0.105** -0.119** -0.113** -0.116** -0.116**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
β̂ 0.523** - - - -
(0.164) - - - -
α̂1 − α̂2 - -0.022** -0.026** -0.018** -0.017**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Low uncertainty
β̂1 - 1.101 1.465* 1.138 1.201
(0.173) (0.249) (0.171) (0.173)
High uncertainty
β̂2 - -0.365** 0.025** -0.383** -0.300**
(0.182) (0.176) (0.188) (0.180)
Threshold estimate - 115.930 85.969 128.525 114.676
99% confidence interval - [100.0 , 122.7] [78.5 , 91.4] [114.3 , 129.9] [113.0 , 129.9]
Test for threshold effects - 0.003 0.086 0.001 0.003
Observations 2674 2674 2674 2674 2674
Countries 14 14 14 14 14
Period 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses, lag length is set
to T
1
4 . The test for threshold effects shows the probability value for the null hypothesis of α̂1 = α̂2 and β̂1 = β̂2;
we used 1000 bootstrap replications for the test. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 1 percent
level, respectively, for the individual null hypotheses of an intercept equal to zero and a slope equal to 1. For the
additional control, the null is that its coefficient estimate is equal to zero.
How sensitive is the evolution of the nominal exchange rate to differences in the nominal
exchange rate regime and inflation? A significant proportion of the literature suggests
that countries with flexible exchange rate regimes should have exchange rates that are
more depreciated than in countries with fixed exchange rates. To explore this possibility,
we include the de facto exchange rate regime proxy constructed by Ilzetzki et al. (2019).
Table 10 shows that, as predicted by the theory, there is a positive and statistically
significant association between the exchange rate regime and the expected change in
nominal exchange rate in all but one of the uncertainty proxies. This suggests that more
flexible exchange rate regimes tend to be associated with more depreciated exchange rates.
Some authors argue that inflation is another variable that could be affecting the omitted
risk premium. To explore this possibility, we include the inflation differential as another
regressor in the Fama equation and find that this variable is not statistically significant
(different from zero; Table 11). In these exercises, Macroeconomic uncertainty remains
a robust threshold variable, and the threshold regression model is not the result of a
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misspecified linear regression as some might argue.
Table 10: Panel data estimation with exchange rate flexibility as a regressor
Linear estimation Threshold estimation
Country EPU Anchored EPU Weighted 1 EPU Weighted 2 EPU
Exchange rate flexibility 0.003* 0.004* 0.003* 0.003** 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
β̂ 0.462** - - - -
(0.167) - - - -
α̂1 − α̂2 - -0.020** -0.022** -0.016* -0.015**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Low uncertainty
β̂1 - 1.028 1.509* 1.067 1.131
(0.175) (0.268) (0.173) (0.175)
High uncertainty
β̂2 - -0.402** 0.009** -0.415** -0.338**
(0.185) (0.178) (0.190) (0.182)
Threshold estimate - 115.930 85.549 128.525 114.676
99% confidence interval - [100.4 , 122.7] [75.3 , 91.4] [75.5 , 129.9] [113.0 , 129.9]
Test for threshold effects - 0.001 0.055 0.004 0.003
Observations 2674 2674 2674 2674 2674
Countries 14 14 14 14 14
Period 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses, lag length is set
to T
1
4 . The test for threshold effects shows the probability value for the null hypothesis of α̂1 = α̂2 and β̂1 = β̂2;
we used 1000 bootstrap replications for the test. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 1 percent
level, respectively, for the individual null hypotheses of an intercept equal to zero and a slope equal to 1. For the
additional control, the null is that its coefficient estimate is equal to zero.
Another variable that has been associated with the evolution of the nominal exchange
rates is commodity terms of trade. According to this literature, favorable commodity
prices tend to be associated with more appreciated exchange rates. To examine this
possibility, we include as a regressor the annual percentage change of commodity terms
of trade for each country (Gruss and Kebhaj, 2019). As reported in Table 12, there
is a negative and statistically significant association between the change of commodity
terms of trade and the expected change in the nominal exchange rate. Perhaps more
importantly, the status of macroeconomic uncertainty as a threshold variable does not
change.
Including all these additional controls in the Fama regression equation delivers similar
results to those discussed. The only notable change is that the inflation differential is
now statistically significant, but the de facto exchange rate regime is not (see Table 13).
Macroeconomic uncertainty remains a robust threshold variable.
There are other variables that we could have left out of the threshold regression model-
for instance, the presence of global factors such as the Great Recession, the evolution
of international oil prices, global financial conditions, etc. Controlling for such variables
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Table 11: Panel data estimation with inflation differential as a regressor
Linear estimation Threshold estimation
Country EPU Anchored EPU Weighted 1 EPU Weighted 2 EPU
Inflation differentials -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
β̂ 0.522** - - - -
(0.170) - - - -
α̂1 − α̂2 - -0.021** -0.024** -0.018* -0.017**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001)
Low uncertainty
β̂1 - 1.059 1.548* 1.096 1.174
(0.182) (0.268) (0.179) (0.181)
High uncertainty
β̂2 - -0.357** 0.062** -0.389** -0.297**
(0.187) (0.178) (0.193) (0.184)
Threshold estimate - 115.931 84.549 128.525 114.676
99% confidence interval - [100.0 , 122.7] [78.5 , 91.4] [75.5 , 129.9] [113.0 , 129.9]
Test for threshold effects - 0.005 0.068 0.005 0.001
Observations 2674 2674 2674 2674 2674
Countries 14 14 14 14 14
Period 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses, lag length is set
to T
1
4 . The test for threshold effects shows the probability value for the null hypothesis of α̂1 = α̂2 and β̂1 = β̂2;
we used 1000 bootstrap replications for the test. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 1 percent
level, respectively, for the individual null hypotheses of an intercept equal to zero and a slope equal to 1. For the
additional control, the null is that its coefficient estimate is equal to zero.
is desirable, but because there are no good proxy measures available, to achieve this we
include a time-fixed effects variable, which is common to all countries in the sample. In
Table 14, we report the results of including such a variable. While there is still evidence
of a threshold effect, the estimate of the slope parameter in the low uncertainty regime is
now statistically different from one for two of the uncertainty proxies.
4.2 Estimation with one-year forecast horizon
What happens if the Fama regression model is estimated using twelve-month deposits in-
stead of three-month deposits? To address this question, we utilize one-year survey-based
exchange rate expectations obtained from Consensus Forecast and twelve-month interest
rates on domestic and foreign exchange deposits.11 Table 15 reports the main findings of
this exercise. Similar to our baseline scenario, there is evidence of an uncertainty thresh-
old effect in the Fama regression model. The slope coefficients are closer to one in the
low uncertainty regime than in the high uncertainty one. However, the estimates are
11For certain months, we had to complete the interest rates obtained from Bloomberg and the central
banks using the SHIBOR for China, and the three-month domestic interest rate for China, Mexico and
India.
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Table 12: Panel data estimation with terms of trade as a regressor
Linear estimation Threshold estimation
Country EPU Anchored EPU Weighted 1 EPU Weighted 2 EPU
Terms of trade -0.276* -0.264* -0.266* -0.258** -0.267*
(0.059) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
β̂ 0.414** - - - -
(0.167) - - - -
α̂1 − α̂2 - -0.019** -0.021** -0.016* -0.015*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Low uncertainty
β̂1 - 0.974 1.452* 1.010 1.075
(0.176) (0.267) (0.174) (0.175)
High uncertainty
β̂2 - -0.425** -0.033** -0.445** -0.379**
(0.184) (0.177) (0.189) (0.181)
Threshold estimate - 115.930 84.549 128.525 114.676
99% confidence interval - [100.0 , 122.2] [75.3 , 91.4] [75.5 , 129.9] [113.0 , 129.9]
Test for threshold effects - 0.002 0.084 0.003 0.002
Observations 2674 2674 2674 2674 2674
Countries 14 14 14 14 14
Period 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses, lag length is set
to T
1
4 . The test for threshold effects shows the probability value for the null hypothesis of α̂1 = α̂2 and β̂1 = β̂2;
we used 1000 bootstrap replications for the test. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 1 percent
level, respectively, for the individual null hypotheses of an intercept equal to zero and a slope equal to 1. For the
additional control, the null is that its coefficient estimate is equal to zero.
statistically different from one in both uncertainty regimes, thus suggesting that the UIP
condition does not hold even in the low uncertainty regime. The low uncertainty results
are similar to those reported in Lee (2011).
4.3 Maximum likelihood estimation
Are our main findings robust to the estimation method? Ramı´rez-Ronda´n (2019) proposes
a maximum likelihood (ML) approach to estimate a dynamic panel threshold model.
Although the model we are dealing with is not strictly dynamic, this is a particular case
of the family of models that can be estimated with the ML method. In order to eliminate
the country-level fixed effect, we take the first difference in equation (5). This results in
∆(ŝit+h−sit) = (α1−α2)∆1(qit ≤ γ)+β1∆(ih,it−ih,it)
++β2∆(ih,it−ih,it)
±+∆eit+h, (15)
where ∆(ŝit+h−sit) = (ŝit+h−sit)−(ŝit−1+h−sit−1), ∆1(qit ≤ γ) = 1(qit ≤ γ)−1(qit−1 ≤ γ);
∆(ih,it − ih,it)
+ = (ih,it − ih,it)1(qit ≤ γ)− (ih,it−1 − ih,it−1)1(qit−1 ≤ γ); ∆(ih,it − ih,it)
± =
27
Table 13: Panel data estimation with controls as regressors
Linear estimation Threshold estimation
Country EPU Anchored EPU Weighted 1 EPU Weighted 2 EPU
Capital controls -0.100** -0.112** -0.107** -0.112** -0.108**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Uncertainty 0.045* 0.047* -0.149* 0.065* 0.012
(0.024) (0.026) (0.056) (0.031) (0.044)
Terms of trade -0.295** -0.279** -0.274** -0.274** -0.283**
(0.060) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058)
Inflation differentials -0.002 -0.002* -0.003** -0.002* -0.002*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exchange rate flexibility 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
β̂ 0.523** - - - -
(0.166) - - - -
α̂1 − α̂2 - -0.016** -0.035** -0.010* -0.015*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Low uncertainty
β̂1 - 1.089 1.528* 1.112 1.205
(0.179) (0.252) (0.177) (0.180)
High uncertainty
β̂2 - -0.325** 0.091** -0.330** -0.275**
(0.180) (0.172) (0.187) (0.179)
Threshold estimate - 115.930 85.969 127.938 114.676
99% confidence interval - [107.5 , 121.8] [84.5 , 96.4] [114.3 , 129.9] [113.0 , 129.9]
Test for threshold effects - 0.000 0.021 0.001 0.001
Observations 2674 2674 2674 2674 2674
Countries 14 14 14 14 14
Period 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses, lag length is set
to T
1
4 . The test for threshold effects shows the probability value for the null hypothesis of α̂1 = α̂2 and β̂1 = β̂2;
we used 1000 bootstrap replications for the test. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 1 percent
level, respectively, for the individual null hypotheses of an intercept equal to zero and a slope equal to 1. The linear
estimation includes the own country uncertainty; the others uncertainty measures give pretty similar results. For
the additional controls, the null is that each coefficient estimate is equal to zero.
(ih,it − ih,it)1(qit > γ)− (ih,it−1 − ih,it−1)1(qit−1 > γ); and ∆eit+h = eit+h − eit−1+h.
12
Let the stacked data and errors for a country be noted as
Xi(γ) =

∆1(qi1 ≤ γ) ∆(ih,i1 − i
∗
h,i1)
+ ∆(ih,i1 − i
∗
h,i1)
±
...
...
...
∆1(qiT ≤ γ) ∆(ih,iT − i
∗
h,iT )
+ ∆(ih,iT − i
∗
h,iT )
±
 ;
12Note that given the nature of the panel threshold model, α1 and α2 cannot be recovered directly;
that is, since the first difference produces α1(1(qit ≤ γ)− 1(qit−1 ≤ γ)) +α2(1(qit > γ)− 1(qit−1 > γ)) =
(α1 − α2)(1(qit ≤ γ)− 1(qit−1 ≤ γ)), where we use that fact that 1(qit > γ) = 1− 1(qit ≤ γ).
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Table 14: Panel data estimation with time fixed effects
Linear estimation Threshold estimation
Country EPU Anchored EPU Weighted 1 EPU Weighted 2 EPU
β̂ 0.579* - - - -
(0.202)
α̂1 − α̂2 - -0.028** -0.032** -0.021** -0.023**
(0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Low uncertainty
β̂1 - 1.341 2.153** 1.392* 1.251
(0.214) (0.288) (0.216) (0.206)
Low uncertainty
β̂2 - -0.174** 0.273** -0.140** -0.299**
(0.197) (0.192) (0.201) (0.207)
Time dummies ✦ ✦ ✦ ✦ ✦
Threshold estimate - 118.667 84.549 120.337 128.112
99% confidence interval - [97.6 , 123.1] [84.5 , 87.4] [114.3 , 128.5] [113.9 , 129.0]
Test for threshold effects - 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
Observations 2674 2674 2674 2674 2674
Countries 14 14 14 14 14
Period 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses, lag length is set
to T
1
4 . The test for threshold effects shows the probability value for the null hypothesis of α̂1 = α̂2 and β̂1 = β̂2; we
used 1000 bootstrap replications for the test. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 1 percent level,
respectively, for the individual null hypotheses of an intercept equal to zero and a slope equal to 1.
Table 15: Panel data estimation with one-year forecast horizon
Linear estimation Threshold estimation
Country EPU Anchored EPU Weighted 1 EPU Weighted 2 EPU
β̂ 0.338** - - - -
(0.089)
α̂1 − α̂2 - -0.004* -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Low uncertainty
β̂1 - 0.614** 0.737** 0.642** 0.635**
(0.096) (0.094) (0.095) (0.093)
High uncertainty
β̂2 - -0.004** 0.123** -0.021** -0.073**
(0.091) (0.091) (0.087) (0.085)
Threshold estimate - 117.796 91.438 127.938 128.563
99% confidence interval - [115.5 , 128.3] [84.6 , 91.4] [117.6 , 129.9] [126.6 , 129.9]
Test for threshold effects - 0.009 0.031 0.007 0.005
Observations 2674 2674 2674 2674 2674
Countries 14 14 14 14 14
Period 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses, lag length is set
to T
1
4 . The test for threshold effects shows the probability value for the null hypothesis of α̂1 = α̂2 and β̂1 = β̂2; we
used 1000 bootstrap replications for the test. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 1 percent level,
respectively, for the individual null hypotheses of an intercept equal to zero and a slope equal to 1.
Yi =

∆(ŝi1+h − si1)
...
∆(ŝiT+h − siT )
 ; and ∆ei =

∆ei1+h
...
∆eiT+h
 ;
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with this notation, the estimation procedure starts by fixing γ at any value in the em-
pirical support of the threshold variable. Note that for any given γ, the maximum like-
lihood estimation (ML) is asymptotically equivalent to the minimum distance estimator∑n
i=1∆e
′
iΩ
−1∆ei; where Ω is a matrix with values of twos and minus ones in the first and
second main diagonals, respectively; and zeros otherwise.
Thus, after taking the first-order condition and by setting the partial derivative equal
to zero, for any given γ, the slope coefficients α1 − α2, β1, and β2 can be obtained by
θ̂(γ) =
( n∑
i=1
Xi(γ)
′Ω−1Xi(γ)
)−1( n∑
i=1
Xi(γ)
′Ω−1Yi
)
, (16)
where θ = (α1 − α2, β1, β2)
′, and then, the minimum distance estimator for a given
threshold parameter γ is
n∑
i=1
∆êi(γ)
′Ω−1∆êi(γ). (17)
where ∆êi(γ) = Yi −Xi(γ)θ̂(γ).
The criterion function (17) is not smooth, since we previously estimated the threshold
by using a grid search across the macroeconomic uncertainty space. Once γ̂ is obtained,
the slope coefficient estimates are then obtained α̂1− α̂2 = α̂1(γ̂)− α̂2(γ̂), β̂1 = β̂1(γ̂), and
β̂2 = β̂2(γ̂). As regards the inference of the parameter estimates and testing for threshold
effects, we follow the steps of the least-squares estimation of Hansen (1999).
In Table 16, we report the results of the minimum distance estimator, which are asymp-
totically equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator. Overall, the main results are
very similar to those reported in Table 6. Nevertheless, all slope estimates have slightly
higher values. Thus, we confirm the presence of threshold effects, the failure of UIP in
the high uncertainty regime, and the holding of the UIP in the low uncertainty regime.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study whether macroeconomic uncertainty can help explain the uncov-
ered interest parity puzzle. We postulate that the link between macroeconomic uncer-
tainty and the UIP could be usefully modeled using a panel threshold regression model,
where macroeconomic uncertainty is the threshold variable. Using survey-based exchange
rate expectations, we find that for a different measure of macroeconomic uncertainty, there
is a statistically significant macroeconomic uncertainty threshold that splits the sample
into two regimes: a low-uncertainty regime and a high-uncertainty regime, respectively.
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Table 16: Maximum likelihood panel data estimation
Linear estimation Threshold estimation
Country EPU Anchored EPU Weighted 1 EPU Weighted 2 EPU
β̂ 0.488** - - - -
(0.032)
α̂1 − α̂2 - -0.020** -0.022** -0.016** -0.015**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Low uncertainty
β̂1 - 1.048 1.517** 1.093 1.148*
(0.074) (0.140) (0.080) (0.075)
High uncertainty
β̂2 - -0.357** 0.037** -0.368** -0.305**
(0.101) (0.062) (0.095) (0.104)
Threshold estimate - 115.930 84.475 127.938 114.676
99% confidence interval - [100.0 , 122.7] [75.1 , 91.4] [75.5 , 129.6] [113.0 , 130.0]
Test for threshold effects - 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000
Observations 2674 2674 2674 2674 2674
Countries 14 14 14 14 14
Period 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12 03m01-18m12
Notes: White standard errors are in parentheses. The test for threshold effects shows the probability value for the
null hypothesis of α̂1 = α̂2 and β̂1 = β̂2; we used 1000 bootstrap replications for the test. * and ** denote statistical
significance at the 10 and 1 percent level, respectively, for the individual null hypotheses of an intercept equal to
zero and a slope equal to 1.
More importantly, our analysis finds the UIP condition holds in the low-uncertainty
regime but does not in the high-uncertainty one.13 The subtle effect of macroeconomic
uncertainty on UIP suggests that both the linearity of the Fama regression model and
the omission of macroeconomic uncertainty from this model might be at the core of the
negative empirical results widely reported in the literature. Our findings are robust to
the use of different uncertainty measures, the inclusion of other control variables, changes
in the maturity of the deposits, and the estimation methods.
Why does UIP hold in a low-uncertainty regime but not in a high-uncertainty one? The
theoretical literature is virtually silent on this, and our findings suggest that this can be
a fruitful area for future research. There are indications that macroeconomic uncertainty
can affect financial market liquidity, the volume of assets traded, and excess returns in
currency asset operations. Moreover, macroeconomic uncertainty also seems to affect
credit market conditions. All these factors justify including macroeconomic uncertainty
in the Fama regression. We have found evidence that uncertainty is a robust threshold
variable. This result should inspire future theoretical efforts in the field.
13These econometrics results hold on average but not necessarily continuously. This means that there
can be episodes where UIP fails in a low-uncertainty regime and where UIP holds in a high-uncertainty.
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